![]() Zanardi (Eds.), The IMF, World Bank, and Policy Reform, Routledge, London. Voting power in the Bretton woods institutions, Ch. Algorithms for Computing Voting Power Indices, University of Warwick, website: (2002), An empirical comparison of the performance of classical power indices. (Ed.), Power, Voting and Voting Power, Physica-Verlag, Wurtzburg. ![]() The Measurement of Voting Power, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications (Vol. Mathematics of Operations Research, 4(2), 99–131.įeller, W. Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index. American Sociological Review, 38, 1–17.ĭubey, P., & Shapley, L. Coleman, 1986, Individual Interests and Collective Action, Cambridge University Press.Ĭoleman, J. Lieberman (Ed.), Social Choice, New York, Gordon and Breach Reprinted in J.S. Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. Theory and Decision, 7, 29–56.Ĭoleman, J. It can be generalised in many ways: our analysis is a priori (assuming formal voting and ignoring actual voting behaviour) but can be made empirical with voting data reflecting behaviour it examines the consequences of two blocs but can easily be extended to more.īrams, S., & Affuso, P. This technique of analysis has many real world applications to legislatures and international bodies. ![]() We briefly consider incentives to migrate between blocs. We show how the power indices of individual bloc members can be used to study the implications of the formation of blocs and how voting power varies as bloc size varies. We apply the Penrose index (the absolute Banzhaf index) to a hypothetical voting body with 100 members. We argue against the Shapley–Shubik index and show that anyway the Shapley–Shubik index per head is inappropriate for voting blocs. Our starting points are the papers by Riker (Behavioural Science, 1959, “A test of the adequacy of the power index”) and Coleman (American Sociological Review, 1973, “Loss of Power”). Our analysis is theoretical, intended to contribute to a theory of positive political science in which social actors are motivated by the pursuit of power as measured by objective power indices. We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that has voting blocs.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |